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Essay 
PATENT VALIDITY ACROSS THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH: EX ANTE FOUNDATIONS FOR 
POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
ARTI K. RAI† 
INTRODUCTION 
In patent law, as in most areas of law, Congress, courts, and 
administrative agencies are the key institutions with the potential to 
shape policy.1 In practice, though, courts have generally been 
regarded as the dominant players in shaping patent policy. This 
perception of judicial dominance is grounded in several notable 
features of the patent system. Since 1790, when the first patent 
statute2 was enacted, patent legislation has been remarkably general 
in its provisions. Even when Congress has passed legislation to update 
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 1. I use the term “patent policy” advisedly. I mean to distinguish it from the 
determinations of science-related adjudicative facts, such as the state of the scientific art at the 
time the patent applicant filed for her invention, which represent an important mechanism by 
which patent-validity standards implement the policy goal of innovation. See Stuart Minor 
Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from 
Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 276–77 (2007) (discussing the requirement that a 
patentable invention be scientifically “nonobvious” and noting that this requirement is premised 
on the view that if the invention were obvious, it could have arisen without a patent incentive). 
Policy is also distinct from questions of pure law, to which the patent statute provides clear 
answers. 
 2. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109. 
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the Patent Act of 1952 (Patent Act),3 the amendments have typically 
left significant room for interpretation. Rather than passing more 
detailed provisions, Congress has instead delegated responsibility for 
interpreting the statute to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO) and the courts—with a historical emphasis on the courts. The 
judicial nature of patent law has been particularly evident since 1982, 
when Congress created a single specialized court, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, to hear all appeals in patent cases.4 
These appeals include direct challenges to the PTO’s denial of patent 
applications. They also include challenges to the decisions of regional 
trial courts regarding patent validity and infringement with respect to 
previously granted patents. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the institutional debate has often 
focused on the Federal Circuit. Many patent scholars have written 
about the Federal Circuit, and some law reviews have devoted entire 
issues to analysis of the Federal Circuit as an institution.5  
But other institutions are also beginning to compete for 
institutional primacy. The Supreme Court’s increasingly assertive 
review of the Federal Circuit has prompted many articles discussing 
the Court’s institutional role.6 Even the PTO, long considered a weak 
agency because of its limited rulemaking power, has begun to flex its 
muscle. In recent years, the PTO has repeatedly challenged Federal 
 
 3. The most recent fully codified version of the patent statute is found at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–
376 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). This version does not include, however, significant amendments 
made in 2011. 
 4. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). For a discussion comparing and contrasting the 
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction with that of its predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals, see generally Jeffrey Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: The Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
843 (2010). 
 5. E.g., Symposium, The Federal Circuit as an Institution, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 749 (2010); 
Symposium, The Federal Circuit: The National Appellate Court Celebration and Introspective 
Symposium, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 513 (2010). 
 6. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the 
Supreme Court—And Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 793 (2010) (“Supreme Court 
involvement in Federal Circuit decisions should be regarded as highly salutary, for these two 
tribunals have a great deal to learn from one another.”); John Golden, The Supreme Court as 
“Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA 
L. REV. 657, 662 (2009) (arguing that Supreme Court review of patent decisions is important but 
that it should be relatively circumscribed); Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 
YALE L.J. 2, 42–62 (2010) (discussing and critiquing the “holistic” approach taken by the 
Supreme Court in its patent jurisprudence). 
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Circuit decisions before the Court.7 The PTO also succeeded in 
securing passage of the 2011 America Invents Act (AIA).8 Although 
the AIA did not give the agency the expansive rulemaking authority 
over questions of substantive patent law that had been proposed in 
earlier versions of the legislation, the AIA did confer upon the PTO 
the ability to conduct postgrant review proceedings that resemble 
formal adjudications.9 Under standard administrative law, formal 
adjudication is a salient mechanism through which agencies make 
policy. Based on these developments, patent-law scholars are 
beginning to treat the PTO as a full-fledged participant in the 
institutional debate. 
To some extent, patent-law scholars have also begun to 
recognize the policymaking role of agency actors beyond the PTO. 
For the most part, the literature has focused on the International 
Trade Commission (ITC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 
Scholars note that the ITC—which issues injunctions barring the 
entry of goods that infringe valid U.S. patents—affects patent policy, 
particularly policy related to remedies for infringement.10 The 
literature on the FTC emphasizes the agency’s prominent role in 
investigating the antitrust implications of patent-litigation settlements 
between brand-name- and generic-pharmaceutical firms.11 
 
 7. See infra notes 29–31. 
 8. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be 
codified in scattered sections of 15, 28, 35, 42, and 51 U.S.C.). 
 9. Prior to the AIA, the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 
tit. IV, 113 Stat. 1501A-552, had given the PTO some ability to conduct inter partes adjudicatory 
proceedings, as well as additional authority over internal managerial matters. See generally 
Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 
1972–75 (2009) (discussing these developments). 
 10. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent 
Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 73–80 (2008) 
(discussing various aspects of the ITC’s role in the patent system); Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, 
Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1551 (2011) (“[T]he ITC can grant broad exclusion 
orders to companies whose patents have been infringed by imported goods.”); Sapna Kumar, 
The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 533 (2009) 
(“[T]he ITC makes patent policy that is sometimes in tension with the purpose of the patent 
system.”); David Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction 
Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade 
Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1728 (2009) (“Counterbalancing the lack of 
damages, injunctions are awarded under a more liberal standard in the ITC.”). 
 11. See Daniel Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1200–01, 1206–11 
(2008) (detailing the FTC’s extensive involvement in the issue of reverse payments and arguing 
that the FTC’s adjudicatory position in settlements essentially adopts a rule that should be given 
deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984)); C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate View of Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking 
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That non-PTO agency actors play a significant role in specific 
areas of patent policy beyond patent validity is unsurprising. After all, 
under the Patent Act, the PTO’s decisionmaking authority is largely 
confined to the adjudication of questions of patent validity.12 More 
notable is the manner in which the Supreme Court’s renewed interest 
in patent law has transformed the executive branch’s Supreme Court 
litigator, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Office of the Solicitor 
General (SG), into a significant player in patent policy across the 
board, including on core issues of patent validity.13 
In many respects, however, the SG is a generalist actor that 
refines and arbitrates among the views of underlying agencies that 
have more specialized expertise in the legal questions at issue. These 
underlying agencies themselves play a powerful role in shaping the 
litigation positions taken by the SG and by the DOJ more generally. 
Yet scholars have generally failed to explore the influence exercised 
by these underlying agencies, whether before the Supreme Court or 
in other contexts.  
A striking and candid acknowledgment of these agencies’ 
influence emerged in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office (Myriad II),14 a 2011 case involving a challenge to 
breast-cancer-gene-related patents held by the diagnostic firm Myriad 
on the ground that the patents covered subject matter that should not 
have been eligible for patenting.15 The amicus brief filed by the U.S. 
government in that case observed: 
The extent to which basic discoveries in genetics may be patented is 
a question of great importance to the national economy, to medical 
science, and to the public health. This appeal consequently 
implicates the expertise and responsibilities of a wide array of 
 
To Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 639–40 (2009) (discussing both 
adjudicatory actions by the FTC and the possibility of the FTC’s engaging in rulemaking with 
respect to reverse payments in settlements of patent disputes between brand-name- and generic-
pharmaceutical firms). 
 12. See Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2006) (providing that the PTO “shall be 
responsible for the granting and issuing of patents”). 
 13. See John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 518, 519 (2010) (“The innovative jurisdictional structure of the new appellate 
court has fostered a unique relationship between the Federal Circuit and the Solicitor General’s 
Office and has, in a subtle but meaningful way, shifted power over the development of patent 
law from the judicial to the executive branch of government.”). 
 14. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad II), 653 
F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 15. Id. at 1339–40, 1355. 
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federal agencies and components, including the [PTO], the National 
Institutes of Health . . . , the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Office 
of Science and Technology Policy, and the National Economic 
Council, among others.16 
That the government saw the need specifically to identify the interests 
of agencies other than the PTO that were interested in the Myriad 
litigation is unsurprising, given that its amicus brief urged the court to 
reject a decades-old PTO practice of treating almost all DNA as 
patentable subject matter.17 
Viewed on its own, the Myriad litigation might be seen as sui 
generis—a case in which many agencies got involved only because of 
the emotional resonance of the plaintiffs’ allegations that Myriad was 
using its patents to deny access to breast-cancer testing. But the 
involvement of agencies other than the PTO in core questions of 
DNA-patent validity is not an isolated event. To the contrary, the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) has, since the early 1990s, 
substantially influenced the evolution of DNA-patent jurisprudence. 
Indeed, the available empirical evidence indicates that NIH influence, 
primarily manifested in two sets of PTO guidelines issued in 2001, has 
been an important factor in mitigating the development of a patent 
thicket in the area of DNA-related research.18 NIH’s persistent 
interest in the issue of DNA patenting is hardly surprising. NIH is by 
far the biggest funder of biomedical research in the world. It funds 
over $30 billion of academic biomedical research annually, a 
significant percentage of which leads to patents, including patents that 
relate to, or encompass, nucleic acids.19 
As a normative matter, investigating the policymaking role of 
agency actors other than the PTO in patent law contributes to the 
 
 16. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 1, Myriad 
II, 653 F.3d 1329 (No. 2010-1406). 
 17. The government’s brief did not address Myriad’s DNA-related process/method claims. 
For this reason, I focus in this Essay on the product claims. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 18. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 19. For example, analysis of the leading public database of DNA patents shows that the 
University of California system is the third-largest holder of DNA patents. See Robert Cook-
Deegan & Christopher Heaney, Patents in Genomics and Human Genetics, 11 ANN. REV. 
GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 383, 388 fig.3 (2010) (indicating that the University of California 
system holds approximately 1200 patents). Not only do academic institutions such as the 
University of California hold DNA patents that stem from NIH funding, but NIH’s intramural 
research program also yields many DNA patents: the same DNA-patent database shows that 
NIH is the fifth-largest holder of U.S. DNA patents. Id. 
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debate over institutional choice in patent policy. Critics of a 
policymaking role for the PTO, even a role limited to the context of 
patent validity, have expressed concern about agency capture.20 The 
capture issue, however, is not only more complex than has been 
conventionally understood but is also mitigated by the reality that, at 
least in significant DNA-related cases, PTO decisionmaking is 
embedded in the larger institutional apparatus of the executive 
branch. Although debate among knowledgeable agencies with 
different perspectives may not always yield the right conclusion, it is 
at least likely to produce conclusions that are plausible. The existence 
of this interagency debate should be a factor that counsels in favor of 
judicial deference to determinations of patent policy by the executive 
branch. 
Moreover, although interagency debate has, to date, generally 
been limited to the DNA context, one can imagine the creation of 
institutional structures that would allow agency actors with 
perspectives differing from those of the PTO to play a more 
systematic role. Agencies such as the FTC and the DOJ Antitrust 
Division, which have missions that emphasize innovation through 
competition, are obvious candidates. To ensure the requisite White 
House coordination, a core executive-branch agency such as DOJ 
Antitrust may be more suitable than an independent agency such as 
the FTC.21 
Systematic interagency debate would be particularly useful if 
begun ex ante. Although ex ante action should be subject to revision, 
policymaking that is conducted entirely ex post has considerable 
associated liabilities. Most obviously, ex post approaches produce 
delay and uncertainty. Moreover, as this Essay’s discussion of the 
 
 20. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT 106–07 (2009) (“The Patent and Trademark Office interacts regularly with those 
seeking patents, but very little with third parties affected by the patents they grant.”); Craig 
Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 57 (2010) 
(discussing “capture-prone administrative rulemaking”). 
 21. The administrative-law literature on whether (and to what extent) independent 
agencies should be subject to White House control is voluminous. For purposes of this Essay, I 
do not take a position on this literature, except to note the practical point that both scholars and 
policymakers consider White House coordination of executive-branch agencies less 
controversial than White House coordination of independent agencies. Cf. Elena Kagan, 
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2320 (2001) (“[M]ost statutes granting 
discretion to executive branch—but not independent—agency officials should be read as leaving 
ultimate decisionmaking authority in the hands of the President.”). 
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Myriad litigation illustrates,22 the passage of time can significantly 
constrain available policy options. Appellate courts that adjudicate 
disputes ex post will justifiably be concerned about the retroactive 
effects of their decisionmaking on large numbers of existing patents. 
Additionally, as discussed in this Essay, to the extent that concerns 
about retroactive effects are more salient to courts when they 
contract patent rights than when they expand such rights, ex post 
adjudicatory approaches may yield a one-way ratchet in favor of 
expansion. 
A larger role for ex ante decisionmaking would not necessarily 
require the PTO, or the executive branch more generally, to have 
rulemaking authority over patent validity. Although such authority 
would produce controlling law more quickly, reasonably expeditious 
and deferential review of guidelines would achieve many of the 
benefits of such authority. Indeed, to the extent that guidelines were 
to be implemented in a postgrant review proceeding that resembled a 
formal adjudication, the strong form of deference enunciated by the 
Court in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.23 and its progeny would be applicable. Importantly, a guideline-
focused approach would also be more politically feasible than a 
wholesale shift to PTO rulemaking. 
Part I of this Essay discusses and adds to the existing literature 
on patent policymaking by agencies. It focuses on the particularly 
pervasive role that one executive-branch agency, NIH, has played in 
DNA-patenting debates. Part II sets out several criteria—including 
expertise, relative insulation from capture, and at least some ability to 
act prospectively—that are desirable for the patent-policymaking 
apparatus to have. It further argues that active involvement by other 
executive-branch agencies would diminish concerns about PTO 
capture, concerns that continue to represent the most important 
objection to establishing a significant PTO policymaking presence. As 
the DNA-patenting cases demonstrate, decisions on which 
knowledgeable agencies with different perspectives agree ex ante 
should be worthy of respect by reviewing courts. Part III considers 
how the executive branch could be more involved in setting 
patentability policy ex ante, not only in the area of DNA patenting 
but also more generally. It uses software patenting as an example of 
an arena in which ex ante approaches might have been useful. Part III 
 
 22. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 23. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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evaluates the role that an agency that emphasizes innovation through 
competition—such as the DOJ Antitrust Division—could play as an 
interlocutor for the PTO. Part IV asks whether the PTO should be 
given rulemaking authority over questions of substantive patent law, 
particularly if such authority were to require consultation with sister 
agencies. It concludes that although this step is probably not 
politically feasible, an approximation of that kind of authority could 
be achieved through swift and deferential review of PTO decisions 
that apply administrative guidelines. 
I.  THE POLICY ROLE OF AGENCY ACTORS OUTSIDE THE PTO 
This Part addresses the role of agency actors other than the PTO. 
Section A reviews the existing literature with a particular focus on 
discussions of the role played by the SG. Section B relates in detail 
the extensive role played by NIH and other life-science agencies in 
determining executive-branch positions on such patent-validity 
requirements as utility, written-description, and patentable-subject-
matter. 
A. Existing Literature 
Although the literature discussing the role of agency actors in 
making patent policy has historically focused on the PTO, scholars 
have begun to examine three other actors: the ITC, the FTC, and the 
SG.  
The Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C.,24 significantly bolstered the influence of the 
ITC. That case held that under patent law’s traditional equitable 
principles, it is inappropriate for a district court automatically to 
order injunctive relief upon a finding that a patent is valid and 
infringed.25 The eBay case did not, however, affect the ITC’s 
legislative authorization to exclude goods from the United States 
upon a finding that they infringe a valid patent; thus, the case made 
the ITC an attractive forum for patentees and a potentially important 
policy actor in the area of remedies.26 
 
 24. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 25. See id. at 393 (“To the extent that the District Court adopted such a categorical rule, 
then, its analysis cannot be squared with the principles of equity adopted by Congress.”); see 
also supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 26. Additionally, the ITC has played a policymaking role in the narrow arena of what 
constitutes a valid defense against charges of infringement in the context of imported goods. It 
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Scholars have also discussed the FTC and the prominent role it 
has played in the debate about the antitrust concerns raised by 
settlements in patent disputes between brand-name- and generic-
pharmaceutical firms. Several recent contributors to this debate argue 
that courts should give greater deference to FTC positions with 
respect to these settlements.27 
Most relevantly for this Essay’s purposes, Professor John Duffy 
highlights the role of the SG in working with the PTO and other 
interested agencies to shape patent policy across the board, including 
policy on core questions of patent validity. The SG’s increasing 
influence is largely a consequence of the Court’s decision to begin 
taking significantly more patent cases than it has in the past.28 Indeed, 
from 1996 through June 2011, the Court granted certiorari in almost 
as many patent cases as the Federal Circuit heard en banc—nineteen 
Supreme Court cases to twenty-three en banc Federal Circuit cases.29 
The data show that the executive branch participated either as a 
party or as an amicus in seventeen of the nineteen Supreme Court 
cases.30 In ten of those seventeen cases, the executive branch 
 
has played that role because the Federal Circuit has chosen to give the strong form of 
administrative deference enunciated by Chevron to certain ITC interpretations of the trade-
related statutes the agency interprets. See Kinik Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1363 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“To the extent that there is any uncertainty or ambiguity in the interpretation 
of [the statute], deference must be given to the view of the agency that is charged with its 
administration.”). 
 27. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 28. See Duffy, supra note 13, at 523 (discussing the Court’s return to patents beginning in 
the mid- to late 1990s). 
 29. Specifically, from 1996 through June 2011, the Court took nineteen cases. This figure is 
derived by taking the sixteen cases identified by Professor Duffy, see id. at 539, and adding to 
them the three patent cases (Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. 
Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011), Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238 
(2011), and Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011)) that the Court 
heard in its 2010 Term. According to Professor Jason Rantanen, from 1996 through March 2011, 
the Federal Circuit heard twenty-two cases en banc. Jason Rantanen, Federal Circuit En Banc 
Patent Decisions, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 8, 2011, 4:23 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/
03/federal-circuit-en-banc-patent-decisions.html. If one adds to that list Therasense, Inc. v. 
Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc), decided by the Federal 
Circuit en banc in May 2011, one arrives at a total of twenty-three cases.  
 30. I reviewed the government’s briefs in these seventeen cases to determine which 
agencies were listed on the briefs. The PTO was on the brief in all of the cases other than 
Stanford. That case involved patent issues raised by the Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010), a statute governing the patentability of federally funded research that 
is not administered by the PTO, but by a sister agency within the Commerce Department: the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology. I address relevant questions raised by the 
inconsistent administration of the Bayh-Dole Act in Part II.C. See infra notes 143–44 and 
accompanying text. In addition to the PTO, the FTC was on the brief in Illinois Tool Works v. 
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disagreed with the Federal Circuit. And in all but one of those ten 
cases, the Court sided with the SG over the Federal Circuit.31 
Two of the Court’s most prominent decisions on core 
patentability questions—its 2010 decision in Bilski v. Kappos32 and its 
2007 decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.33—illustrate the 
strength of the executive branch’s persuasive powers. Bilski 
addressed the threshold requirement of patentable subject matter—
that is, the threshold requirement that an allegedly inventive product 
or process represent patent-eligible subject matter in the first 
instance. In Bilski, the PTO’s position on behalf of the government 
regarding how best to identify processes that constitute patent-
eligible subject matter was in tension with that taken by many three-
judge panels of the Federal Circuit.34 The government’s proposed 
test—considering whether the process involved a machine or physical 
transformation—did not fully convince the Court. The Court did, 
however, state that the case provided a helpful “clue.”35 
 
Independent Ink, 547 U.S. 28 (2006), which addressed the question of whether a patent should 
be presumed to confer monopoly power. The Department of Health and Human Services was 
on the brief in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005), which addressed 
the scope of the exemption from patent infringement provided in the Drug Price Competition 
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). As noted in the text, however, for 
cases litigated before the Supreme Court, the SG plays something of a convening role across the 
executive branch. Thus, interested agencies can and do provide input even when they are not 
explicitly listed on the brief. 
 31. The single case in which the Federal Circuit’s position won out over the SG’s position 
was Stanford. Thus the 9–0 winning streak cited by Professor Duffy in his article, see Duffy, 
supra note 13, at 540, had ended by the end of the 2010 Term. 
 32. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 33. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 34. Sitting en banc in Bilski, the Federal Circuit largely adopted the position urged by the 
government. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[W]e agree with the 
PTO that the machine-or-transformation test is the correct test to apply in determining whether 
a process claim is patent-eligible under [35 U.S.C. § 101].”), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 
S. Ct. 3218 (2010). In so doing, however, it also rejected the positions previously taken by many 
three-judge Federal Circuit panels. 
 35. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227. In any event, the Court’s 5–4 decision to adopt a highly 
nebulous “abstraction” standard for whether an innovation constitutes patentable subject 
matter in the context of a process claim was, at best, only an initial step. Many commentators 
have complained about the lack of guidance provided by Bilski. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Forty 
Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial 
Textualism and the Missed Opportunity To Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1305–07 (2011) (discussing the costs of the Supreme Court’s “ungrounded 
and incoherent” decisionmaking in the Bilski case). Shortly thereafter, the Court granted 
certiorari in another dispute about process as patentable subject matter, Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 
RAI IN PRINTER PROOF (2) WITH NIH ATTRIBUTION ADDITION (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2013  10:37 AM 
2012] PATENT POLICY AND THE EXECUTIVE 1247 
Although Bilski represented only a partial win for the 
government, KSR was an unequivocal win. KSR involved the 
patentability requirement of nonobviousness, generally considered to 
be the most important of the various patentability requirements.36 To 
demonstrate nonobviousness, an applicant must show that her 
invention would not have been obvious to a scientist with “ordinary 
skill” in the relevant area of science.37 
Nonobviousness disputes often turn on whether relevant prior 
inventions and publications, known as “prior art,” can appropriately 
be combined to show obviousness. For years, the PTO’s position on 
combining prior art to show nonobviousness was rebuffed by the 
Federal Circuit. Specifically, to demonstrate the obviousness of an 
applicant’s invention, many three-judge panels required PTO 
examiners to identify in the prior art a specific document that 
provided a “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” (TSM) that had 
prompted the applicant to combine the prior art. Over a number of 
years, the PTO repeatedly argued that its examiners should not 
always have to point to documentary evidence indicating that 
particular prior art references should be combined. Rather, according 
to the PTO, in keeping with pre-Federal Circuit case law on official 
notice,38 examiners should be able to invoke their own knowledge of 
what an ordinary scientist in the relevant area would be capable of 
doing.39 But the Federal Circuit was not convinced. Although Federal 
 
131 S. Ct. 3027 (2011), a case that raised the question of whether a process that involves 
administering a drug and then measuring metabolite levels to calibrate further dosages 
represented patentable subject matter. A petition for certiorari was also filed in the Myriad II 
case in late 2011. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc. (U.S. Dec. 6, 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/association_of_
molecular_v__myriad_petition_for_writ_of_certiorari.pdf. 
 36. See, e.g., Irving Kayton, Nonobviousness of the Novel Invention—35 U.S.C. §103, in 
NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 2:101, 2:102 (John F. 
Witherspoon ed., 1980) (“[I]n virtually every patent infringement suit the defense of 
obviousness under [35 U.S.C. § 103] is asserted . . . .”). 
 37. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
 38. In re Application of Bozek, 416 F.2d 1385, 1390 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (noting that an 
examiner could, in reaching a conclusion of obviousness, rely on the “common knowledge and 
common sense of the person of ordinary skill in the art”). 
 39. See, e.g., In re Beasley, 117 F. App’x 739, 743–44 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (unpublished 
decision) (rejecting the PTO’s reliance on the “examiner’s and its own knowledge as skilled 
artisans” in determining nonobviousness); In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(rejecting the PTO’s reliance on an “examiner’s conclusory statements”); In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 
1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (rejecting the Board’s efforts to base its decisions on “its own 
understanding or experience—or on its assessment of what would be basic knowledge or 
common sense”). 
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Circuit panels were not unanimous in rejecting the PTO’s desire to 
rely on “common knowledge and common sense,” a large number of 
panels penned excoriating opinions.40 
The PTO and SG declined to appeal any of these cases. But 
because the Federal Circuit often applied a rigid interpretation of the 
TSM test not only in direct reviews of PTO patent denials but also in 
collateral challenges to validity brought by defendants in 
infringement litigation, one such defendant, KSR, filed a petition for 
certiorari on the question. When the Supreme Court requested the 
SG’s view as to whether it should grant certiorari,41 the executive 
branch responded with a strong statement in favor of the grant. In its 
brief recommending a grant of certiorari on the merits, the 
government emphasized the “unnecessary” pressure imposed on the 
PTO by the documentary TSM requirement. The government also 
noted that the requirement conflicted with settled administrative-law 
principles of official notice.42 In what was arguably the most important 
patent-law case in decades, the executive branch secured an 
unequivocal victory. The Court held that “[r]igid preventative rules 
that deny factfinders recourse to common sense . . . are neither 
necessary under [its] case law nor consistent with it.”43  
 
 40. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 1, at 290–93 (discussing the language in certain panel 
opinions). 
 41. See Duffy, supra note 13, at 529–31 (discussing the Court’s growing use of “Calls for 
Views of the Solicitor General” in patent cases and the importance of those calls in the Court’s 
decisions to grant certiorari). 
 42. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 17–19, KSR Int’l 
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2453601, at *26 (“The PTO 
should instead be allowed to bring to bear its full expertise—including its reckoning of the basic 
knowledge and common sense possessed by persons in particular fields of endeavor—when 
making the predictive judgment whether an invention would have been obvious to a person of 
ordinary skill in the art. The patent applicant should bear the burden of proving PTO’s Board 
and examiners wrong.”). 
 43. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. Notably, although KSR did not itself involve the life sciences, the 
decision ended up having considerable influence on the life sciences. In the 1993 case In re Bell, 
991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993), the PTO pressed the argument that for the average scientist 
working in the area, knowing a general method for selecting genes through the use of nucleotide 
probes, as well as the complete or partial amino acid of the protein for which a gene of interest 
coded, would render the DNA sequence for the gene obvious, id. at 783. The three-judge panel 
in that case dismissed as largely irrelevant the PTO’s assessment of biotechnological science. See 
id. at 784 (discussing and rejecting the PTO’s “proposition that, just as closely related homologs, 
analogs, and isomers in chemistry may create a prima facie case, the established relationship in 
the genetic code between a nucleic acid and the protein it encodes also makes a gene prima facie 
obvious over its correspondent protein” (citation omitted)). Two years later, in In re Deuel, 51 
F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995), the agency repeated the obviousness argument, only to be rejected 
again, with a pointed citation to Bell. See id. at 1559 (“The PTO’s focus on known methods for 
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B. The Role of NIH and Other Life-Science Agencies 
The Supreme Court does not, however, represent the only venue 
in which executive-branch agencies other than the PTO have 
influenced the debate on patent validity. In this Section, I discuss the 
role that NIH and other executive agencies interested in the life 
sciences have played. Notably, this role has emerged not only in 
litigation ex post but also in the process of guideline formulation ex 
ante.44 
The key example of guideline formulation ex ante was prompted 
by a debate over the patenting of fragments of genes known as 
“expressed sequence tags” (ESTs). My next discussion focuses on the 
evolution of this debate. 
1. Ex Ante Influences on the Utility and Written-Description 
Requirements.  In 1991, well before any other institutional actor was 
paying attention to the issue, NIH director Bernadine Healy had to 
decide whether to file patent applications covering more than two 
thousand ESTs identified by NIH scientist J. Craig Venter. At that 
point, Venter knew only that the ESTs were somehow associated with 
neurological function and disease. In a “special report” published in 
the New England Journal of Medicine, Healy justified her decision to 
seek patents. She argued that simply putting the sequences into the 
public domain might undermine the possibility of patent protection 
for the full-length genes of which the ESTs were a part.45 This result 
 
potentially isolating the claimed DNA molecules is also misplaced because the claims at issue 
define compounds, not methods.” (citing Bell, 991 F.2d at 785)). The PTO and the SG chose not 
to appeal Bell or Deuel. More than a decade later, however, the PTO was able to use the 
Court’s decision in KSR to overturn these cases. The KSR Court discussed briefly the 
longstanding patent-law principle that although an invention that is “obvious to try” is not 
necessarily obvious, it might be obvious if the universe of possible solutions is finite and 
predictable. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. The PTO seized upon this short discussion to set up a test 
case, In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In the 2009 Kubin decision, a three-judge 
panel of the Federal Circuit unanimously agreed with the PTO and finally interred Bell and 
Deuel. See id. at 1358–61 (“Insofar as Deuel implies the obviousness inquiry cannot consider 
that the combination of the claim’s constituent elements was ‘obvious to try,’ the Supreme 
Court in KSR unambiguously discredited that holding.” (quoting In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1559)). 
 44. As discussed further in Part IV, the PTO does not have rulemaking authority over 
patent-validity standards. Thus, to the extent that it has discussed those standards ex ante, it has 
done so through guidelines.  
 45. See Bernadine Healy, Special Report on Gene Patenting, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 664, 
667 (1992) (“Publishing the partial or full sequences of novel genes without filing for patents 
may thus foreclose future patenting by anyone who discovers the full gene by identifying its 
function and may make the newly discovered genes unattractive to private industry for use in 
product development.”). 
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was undesirable, according to Healy, because patent protection for 
full-length genes, particularly genes that produce therapeutic 
compounds, is essential to induce private-sector firms to pursue the 
expensive research and development (R&D) associated with clinical 
trials.46 
Healy’s reasoning was flawed. As a matter of standard patent 
law, it is not clear why placing EST sequences in the public domain 
would undermine patents on full-length genes. Moreover, although 
Healy’s analysis acknowledged the potential problem of “patent 
clutter” that would be created by the need for interested researchers 
to license multiple overlapping EST patents on the same gene, she 
dismissed this concern by suggesting that “socially responsible” 
licensing by NIH would mitigate the problem.47 
In this first round of the EST debate, the PTO provided a useful 
counterweight to Healy’s position. It quickly rejected the initial 
patent claims on a number of different validity grounds.48 This 
rejection proved something of a tipping point. NIH’s decision to seek 
EST patents had been controversial from the outset. James Watson, 
the codiscoverer of DNA structure and head of NIH’s project to map 
the entire human genome, had immediately denounced the decision 
and resigned his position with the project.49 Perhaps not surprisingly, 
then, the arrival of a new NIH director under the newly elected 
Clinton administration caused NIH’s approach to shift. The new NIH 
director, Harold Varmus, commissioned two prominent patent-law 
scholars, Professors Rebecca Eisenberg and Robert Merges, to 
analyze whether the applications met the patentability requirement of 
 
 46. See id. (“This concern is particularly serious in the case of a gene that codes for a novel 
compound that may be of great value in combating a rare disease.”). As I discuss further in this 
Essay, patent applications for full-length genes began to be filed in the 1980s. See infra notes 79–
80 and accompanying text. 
 47. See Healy, supra note 45, at 667–68 (“The effect of a patent is largely determined by 
how and whether it is licensed. . . . The NIH has a deservedly good reputation for licensing new 
forms of technology in a socially responsible manner.”).  
 48. Among other issues, the PTO recognized that broad claims to small gene fragments 
could raise novelty concerns, as these fragments could overlap with much of the human genetic 
code. See Thomas B. Kepler, Colin Crossman & Robert Cook-Deegan, Metastasizing Patent 
Claims on BRCA1, 95 GENOMICS 312, 313 (2010) (discussing the application’s rejection by PTO 
examiner James Martinell on several grounds, including novelty). Certain claims in the Myriad 
patents may raise similar concerns. See Kepler et al., supra; see also infra note 100 and 
accompanying text. 
 49. Watson had famously said that finding ESTs was a job that could be “run by monkeys.” 
Tim Beardsley, An Express Route to the Genome?, SCI. AM., Aug. 1998, at 30, 30 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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practical usefulness or “utility.” Professors Eisenberg and Merges 
determined that the applications were vulnerable on utility grounds.50 
Varmus withdrew the applications. He justified his decision by 
noting the ESTs’ lack of proven biological utility, the “possible 
complications of having what is referred to as ‘patent clutter,’” and 
“the problem . . . of so-called ‘gotcha’ patents, in which someone 
would do a lot of work on a gene and find that a patent had already 
been established on the gene.”51 Varmus also observed, however, that 
although NIH had chosen to withdraw the patent applications, “the 
issue [was] not completely resolved.”52 
Varmus’s comment regarding the lack of resolution on the utility 
issue was a dramatic understatement. Indeed, in 1995, in response to 
complaints from the biotechnology patent bar that the agency had 
been applying the utility requirement too strictly, the PTO issued 
guidelines that were widely seen as lowering the utility threshold.53 
Although these liberalized guidelines addressed utility in the 
biotechnology context generally, they had an impact—perhaps 
unintended—on EST applications in particular. By the late 1990s, 
firms like Incyte and Human Genome Sciences were filing thousands 
of patent applications on ESTs of unknown biological function. 
NIH was watching these developments very closely. Extensive 
public comments filed by NIH in subsequent PTO proceedings 
addressing the utility and written-description requirements illustrated 
the depth of NIH’s involvement. According to these comments, early 
in 1997, Varmus expressed to PTO Commissioner Bruce Lehman his 
concern that EST patents would chill genomics research.54 At the 
 
 50. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the Patentability of 
Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 
1, 51 (1995) (“We believe that most of the claims set forth in the NIH patent applications 
probably are not patentable. Although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, we believe 
that it is more likely than not that the Federal Circuit would hold all of the claims invalid for 
lack of utility.”). 
 51. Harold Varmus, Government, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESEARCH 
TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY: SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP HELD AT THE NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, FEBRUARY 15–16, 1996, at 66, 68 (Nat’l Research Council ed., 1997). 
 52. Id.  
 53. Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263 (July 14, 1995); see also ROBERT 
PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 238 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that “the biotechnology industry generally viewed the 
[1995] Guidelines as heralding liberalized treatment of biotechnology applications”). 
 54. Memorandum from Jack Spiegel, Dir., Div. of Tech. Transfer & Dev., Office of Tech. 
Transfer, Nat’l Insts. of Health, to Bruce Lehman, Comm’r of Patents & Trademarks 3 (Sept. 
14, 1998) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“Soon after its February 14, 1997 public 
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same time, the NIH Office of Technology Transfer opined that ESTs 
should not be deemed to meet the utility standard simply because 
they could be used as probes to find the full genes of which they were 
a part.55 When Commissioner Lehman responded that potential EST 
utilities distinct from probing might include forensic identification, 
tissue-type or origin identification, and chromosome identification 
and mapping, NIH persuaded the president of the National Academy 
of Sciences (NAS), Bruce Alberts, to weigh in with a letter rejecting 
Commissioner Lehman’s position.56 Notably, Alberts was not only 
president of the NAS—an organization chartered in 1863 to provide 
the government with independent scientific advice—but also an 
eminent molecular biologist. 
The PTO continued to express resistance to these opinions. In 
the issue of Science dated May 1, 1998, PTO Biotechnology 
Examination Unit head John Doll stated that because ESTs could be 
used to perform research functions such as chromosome identification 
and gene mapping, the PTO would likely issue patents for them.57 
Doll’s commentary was a response to an article coauthored by 
Professor Rebecca Eisenberg arguing that patents on ESTs would 
require follow-on inventors to go through a lengthy and costly 
licensing process that might chill their work.58 Doll agreed that owners 
of patents on full-length genes would have to seek licenses from 
underlying EST patent owners, but he appeared sanguine about the 
possibility of cross-licensing.59 
 
announcement that the PTO considered ESTs patentable subject matter based upon their utility 
as probes, the Director of NIH (Dr. Harold Varmus) communicated his deep public health 
concern that such patents may have a chilling effect within the genomics industry.”). 
 55. Memorandum from Jack Spiegel, Dir., Div. of Tech. Transfer & Dev., Office of Tech. 
Transfer, Nat’l Insts. of Health, to Q. Todd Dickinson, Comm’r of Patents & Trademarks 82–83 
(Mar. 22, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (discussing an April 2, 1997, 
communication in which the PTO agreed with the NIH’s assessment that “ESTs only disclosed 
as a probe for unknown genes [do] not [have] a sufficient patentable utility”).  
 56. See Memorandum from Jack Spiegel to Bruce Lehman, supra note 54, at 4–5 (quoting a 
letter from Alberts in which he stated, in reference to uses such as mapping and tissue typing, 
that “[d]isclosure of DNA sequence alone is plainly insufficient to enable scientists to use an 
EST for any of these purposes” (alteration in original)). 
 57. John J. Doll, The Patenting of DNA, 280 SCIENCE 689, 689–90 (1998).  
 58. See Michael Heller & Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 700 (1998) (“High transaction costs 
may be an enduring impediment to efficient bundling of intellectual property rights in 
biomedical research.”). 
 59. Doll, supra note 57, at 689–90 (discussing examples of cross-licensing in other contexts 
involving broad initial patents). 
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Doll’s position that owners of full-length gene patents would 
have to seek licenses from EST patent owners was an indication that 
EST patents would necessarily be broad. In June 1998, the PTO 
confirmed the patents’ broad scope when it issued interim guidelines 
on another requirement of patentability, the so-called written-
description requirement.60 The written-description requirement, 
which requires that patentees show that they have “possession” of the 
invention that they are claiming, controls the scope of patent claims.61 
Interestingly, though the guidelines were prompted by a 1997 Federal 
Circuit decision, Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & 
Co.,62 which suggested that the written-description requirement would 
narrow the scope of DNA patents, the PTO guidelines suggested that 
claims to ESTs could be broad, encompassing groups of nucleic acids 
of which the ESTs were a part.63 
Ultimately, however, following—in the words of a subsequent 
NIH comment—“much formal and informal discourse on the 
subject,”64 as well as the arrival of a new PTO commissioner, Q. Todd 
 
 60. Request for Comments on Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications 
Under the 35 U.S.C. 112 ¶ 1 “Written Description” Requirement, 63 Fed. Reg. 32,639 (June 15, 
1998). 
 61. For the Federal Circuit’s 2010 en banc articulation of what this requirement means, see 
Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 62. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566–67 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  
 63. Request for Comments on Interim Guidelines, 63 Fed. Reg. at 32,640–41 (indicating 
that “generic” claims would “not typically present a written description problem”). In fairness 
to the PTO, applying the written-description requirement in the manner that the Federal Circuit 
did in Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co. was problematic in terms of the 
scientific state of the art and as a departure from legal precedent. See Arti K. Rai, Intellectual 
Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 
833 (1999) (“[P]atent law doctrines of nonobviousness and written description have, in the 
context of biotechnology, been applied incorrectly by the Federal Circuit. I suggest that the 
CAFC’s mistakes stem from its inability to deal adequately with new technology.”). 
 64. Memorandum from Jack Spiegel to Q. Todd Dickinson, supra note 55, at 83. This 
formal and informal discourse included a number of meetings on the subject coordinated by the 
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy as well as other White House offices. 
Interview with an Anonymous Source (Jan. 4, 2012) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The 
road to compromise was not altogether smooth. For example, on September 23, 1998, the PTO 
extended the comment period on the June 1998 written-description guidelines specifically to 
address the question of ESTs. Revised Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent 
Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 “Written Description” Requirement; Request for 
Comments, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,427, 71,428 (Dec. 21, 1999). At the same time, however, in October 
1998, the PTO issued a patent claiming forty-four ESTs to Incyte Pharmaceuticals. U.S. Patent 
No. 5,817,479 (filed Aug. 7, 1996) (issued Oct. 6, 1998). Although this patent did state that the 
full genes from which the claimed ESTs had been drawn coded for kinases, the amount of actual 
information about biological function provided by that statement is small. The human genome 
contains about five hundred different protein kinases. G. Manning, D.B. Whyte, R. Martinez, T. 
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Dickinson, who had a deep background in patent law, the PTO 
changed its approach. Notably, although the biotechnology industry 
had urged an overall fortification of the utility standard in 1995, 
NIH’s concerns about EST patents in particular were shared by firms 
in the biotechnology industry that would have to license such patents 
to perform their own work.65 Thus, the PTO knew its shift in position 
would be supported by at least some influential members of the 
biotechnology-patent community.66 
In December 1999, the agency issued draft utility guidelines 
requiring all patent applications to demonstrate “specific, substantial, 
and credible” utility.67 In addition to the guidelines, the PTO provided 
training materials for its patent examiners.68 Those materials stated 
that assertions of generic utility would not suffice to show 
patentability, particularly with respect to EST patents.69 Although 
NIH was not entirely happy with the details of the guidelines,70 it 
 
Hunter & S. Sudarsanam, The Protein Kinase Complement of the Human Genome, 298 SCIENCE 
1912, 1912 (2002). Consistent with Doll’s statement in Science about follow-on innovators’ 
having to license EST patents and with the June 1998 guidelines, the claims granted to Incyte 
were broad, arguably encompassing not simply the ESTs but also the full genes of which the 
ESTs were a part. After the patent was issued, NIH sent in “supplemental comments” on the 
written-description guidelines expressing its surprise at the patent and emphasizing “the 
potential deleterious consequences to the development of genomics that may arise from large 
scale issuance of broad patents on research tool discoveries such as ESTs and SNPs.” 
Supplemental Comments from Jack Spiegel, Dir., Div. of Tech. Transfer & Dev., Nat’l Insts. of 
Health, to Q. Todd Dickinson, Comm’r of Patents & Trademarks 5 (Nov. 12, 1998). 
 65. Thus, for example, in subsequent comments, Genentech heartily endorsed the PTO’s 
shift in position with respect to both utility and written description. Letter from Sean A. 
Johnston, Vice President, Intellectual Prop., Genentech, Inc., to Q. Todd Dickinson, Comm’r of 
Patents and Trademarks 1 (Mar. 22, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“We were 
pleased to see that the initial version of the written description guidelines was modified 
significantly to reflect suggestions made by the public. Overall, we believe the latest version of 
the guidelines, as amplified by the training materials, accurately reflects the standards of utility 
and written description.”). 
 66. As former Commissioner Q. Todd Dickinson has noted, the leadership provided by 
him and his chief patent-policy lieutenant, Stephen Kunin, “together with the influence of 
stakeholders inside and outside the government, facilitated the alteration in position.” Interview 
with Q. Todd Dickinson (Jan. 3, 2012). 
 67. Revised Interim Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. at 71,440. 
 68. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REVISED INTERIM UTILITY GUIDELINES 
TRAINING MATERIALS, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/utility.pdf. 
 69. See id. at 5–6, 50–52 (discussing the inadequacy of assertions of generic utility, 
particularly in the context of EST patents). 
 70. Most notably, contrary to NIH’s wishes, the guidelines and accompanying training 
materials refused to adopt a per se rule against claims of utility based on structural similarity, or 
homology, to gene sequences of known function. See Memorandum from Jack Spiegel to Q. 
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praised the PTO’s decision to move to a higher standard.71 The PTO 
utility guidelines were finalized in 2001.72 Under these guidelines, the 
PTO has approved few patent applications for ESTs of unknown 
biological function. 
In December 1999, the PTO also issued revised interim 
guidelines on the written-description requirement.73 Although some 
of the language in the guidelines was confusing,74 the accompanying 
training examples stated that EST patent claims could not encompass 
the larger nucleic acid sequences of which they were a part.75 Thus, 
even assuming that certain claims to ESTs happened to meet the 
utility threshold for patentability, follow-on researchers would 
probably be able to avoid, or “invent around,” the claims. 
As discussed further in Part IV, Congress has not granted the 
PTO rulemaking authority over questions of patent validity. Thus, 
neither the utility guidelines nor the written-description guidelines 
have the force of law. But the PTO’s invocation of the utility 
guidelines to deny EST applications soon became the subject of a test 
case appealed to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit’s 2005 
decision in that test case, In re Fisher,76 noted that the PTO’s utility 
guidelines comported with the court’s own interpretation of the utility 
requirement.77 
Subsequent empirical work has demonstrated that industry 
players thought the utility and written-description guidelines were 
 
Todd Dickinson, supra note 55, at 83–89 (sharply criticizing an example in the training 
guidelines that found utility based on sequence homology).  
 71. Francis Collins, head of the National Human Genome Research Institute, stated, “I 
think the Patent Office deserves credit for moving toward a stronger requirement for utility.” In 
the Crossfire: Collins on Genomes, Patents, and ‘Rivalry,’ 287 SCIENCE 2396, 2397 (2000). 
 72. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
 73. Revised Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 “Written Description” Requirement; Request for Comments, 64 Fed. Reg. 
71,427, 71,427 (Dec. 21, 1999). 
 74. NIH and other commentators expressed concern about the confusing language in the 
interim guidelines. See, e.g., Memorandum from Charles E. Ludlam, Vice President for Gov’t 
Relations, Biotech. Indus. Org., to Q. Todd Dickinson, Comm’r of Patents & Trademarks 4–5 
(Mar. 22, 2000). The final guidelines, issued in 2001, eliminated the confusion. 
 75. Id. at 4 (citing the seventh example in the training materials, which stated that a claim 
to an EST that attempted to encompass larger sequences of which the EST was a part would be 
invalid). 
 76. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 77. Id. at 1372. 
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quite important in forestalling patent thickets.78 In other words, the ex 
ante intervention by NIH worked largely as the agency had hoped, 
yielding a reduction in the transaction-cost hurdles faced by follow-on 
researchers. Although NIH itself may have been most worried about 
the transaction costs faced by the researchers it sponsored, its 
intervention redounded to the benefit of the innovation ecosystem as 
a whole.  
The relatively orderly sequence of events through which relevant 
institutional players addressed the EST controversy stands in contrast 
to the institutional debate over whether DNA sequences are 
patentable subject matter. In the latter debate, executive-branch 
players outside the PTO brought fresh and important perspectives to 
the table. These perspectives, however, came quite late in the debate. 
2. Patentable Subject Matter.  In the discussion of EST patenting 
described in the previous Section, NIH did not address whether and 
to what extent DNA sequences should constitute subject matter that 
is eligible for patenting in the first instance. Rather, NIH implicitly 
assumed that DNA sequences satisifed the threshold definition of 
subject matter eligible for patenting and focused instead on whether 
EST claims satisfied the utility and written-description requirements. 
As discussed below, NIH and other life-science agencies would not 
jump into the fray and voice an opinion with respect to whether DNA 
sequences should be patentable subject matter until decades later—
almost a decade after the EST-patenting debate had concluded at the 
administrative level and several decades after the first DNA patents 
had been granted. 
As the PTO began issuing DNA patents in the 1980s, the patent 
community converged relatively quickly on a certain conventional 
wisdom. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,79 a 1980 decision, the Supreme 
Court adopted a generally expansive view of patentable subject 
matter and deemed genetically altered bacteria eligible for patenting; 
this view, in turn, permitted patents on DNA excised from its natural 
cellular environment. Furthermore, patents on isolated DNA were a 
natural extension of lower court decisions handed down before the 
 
 78. John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents and 
Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 
286 (2003) (explaining that industry respondents credited “changes in the institutional 
environment, particularly new U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) guidelines” with 
“reduc[ing] the threat of breakdown and access restrictions”).  
 79. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
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creation of the Federal Circuit, which allowed patents on purified 
versions of chemical and biochemical products, particularly if those 
products had a different utility when purified.80 Thus, in the view of 
the patent community, although DNA in its cellular environment was 
a product of nature and hence not subject matter eligible for 
patenting, isolated DNA sequences were eligible for patenting. 
Indeed, the PTO invoked this line of reasoning in the late 1990s when 
some commentators raised the patentable-subject-matter issue in 
deliberations over the draft utility guidelines.81 
Notably, the commentators challenging the PTO’s patentable-
subject-matter conclusions, unlike NIH, did not appear to have 
particular clout, so the PTO dismissed their arguments relatively 
quickly.82 Furthermore, perhaps because the conventional wisdom 
had become so firmly entrenched, the issue of patentable subject 
matter was, prior to Myriad II, never even raised in the Federal 
Circuit cases addressing gene patents.83 
 
 80. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), rev’d in 
part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912); In re Application of Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1397 (C.C.P.A. 
1970).  
 81. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093–94 (Jan. 5, 2001) (“Thus, an 
inventor’s discovery of a gene can be the basis for a patent on the genetic composition isolated 
from its natural state and processed through purifying steps that separate the gene from other 
molecules naturally associated with it.”). The PTO’s discussion also invokes Chakrabarty and 
the lower court cases involving purified chemicals. 
 82. See Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Bryson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (stating that the patentable-subject-matter comments “that the PTO issued at 
the time of its 2001 guidelines . . . [were], frankly, perfunctory”). Prior empirical work on 
comments provided by agencies also suggests that comments from sister agencies receive 
particular attention. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A 
Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 87 (2008) (discussing various Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) rulemakings and the particular attention the FCC has paid 
to comments from the National Telecommunications and Information Administration).  
 83. Cf. Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Dyk, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the question of whether isolated genomic 
DNA is patentable subject matter has evaded review). The conventional wisdom was reinforced 
by the fact that most DNA-patent litigation involved DNA that encoded protein drugs. The 
defendants in those cases were commercial competitors of the patent holders. The defendants 
often held their own DNA patents. The prominent biotechnology-patent litigator Jorge 
Goldstein, who was involved in many of these cases, observes that “[n]o defendant who wanted 
to obtain patent protection for the same or similar protein drug-encoding DNAs would ever 
consider raising as a defense that isolated human DNA sequences were not patent-eligible.” 
Jorge A. Goldstein, Isolated Human Gene Patents: Taxonomies and Controversies 7 (Nov. 19, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.illinois.edu/pdf/JorgeGoldstein2
GenePatentChakrabartyPubNovember2010.pdf. The history of DNA-patent litigation thus 
illustrates the manner in which parties’ views in litigation do not necessarily represent the full 
range of policy stances on a particular question. 
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The Myriad litigation brought a set of groups outside of the 
conventional patent community into the litigation process. The 
ACLU and the Public Patent Foundation filed a challenge on behalf 
of twenty largely academic plaintiffs engaged in breast-cancer 
diagnostic testing. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that 
Myriad’s broad product and process patents on the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes were impeding both their clinical work and further 
research on additional mutations in the genes.84 
The district court’s March 2010 decision in Myriad I85 called into 
question decades of conventional wisdom. The court held invalid all 
fifteen contested claims related to seven patents held by Myriad, on 
the ground that the claims did not constitute patentable subject 
matter.86 With respect to the product claims, the court held that 
because the basic informational character of DNA remains the same 
after it has been isolated, Myriad’s claims impermissibly covered 
products of nature. According to the district court, Chakrabarty 
required that a patentable product be markedly different from any 
material found in nature.87 Although the PTO was originally a 
defendant in the action and had filed a brief defending the patents, 
the district court dismissed the claims against the PTO; thus, the U.S. 
government did not have to participate in the inevitable Federal 
Circuit appeal.88 
Nevertheless, the U.S. government filed an amicus brief in the 
Federal Circuit, reversing the position taken by the PTO at the 
district court level. In its brief, the United States drew a distinction 
between claims to DNA sequences that are merely isolated—that is, 
excised from their original cellular environment and other genomic 
material—and claims to sequences that are laboratory-generated 
duplicates of exons—that is, the select portions of DNA sequences 
that actually code for a protein.89 According to the government, the 
latter set of claims encompasses a manmade construct, not a product 
 
 84. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad I), 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 181, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 85. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad I), 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 86. Id. at 220–37. 
 87. Id. at 223.  
 88. Id. at 238.  
 89. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 
16, at 7–8. 
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of nature.90 This laboratory-generated construct is known as cDNA. 
In the government’s view, the district court was correct in striking 
down some of Myriad’s claims—those involving genomic DNA 
(gDNA), but not those involving full-length cDNA.91 
From a formal scientific or legal perspective, the distinction 
between gDNA and full-length cDNA is not entirely compelling. 
Although cDNA creation involves more human intervention than 
does gDNA creation, gDNA creation also generally involves some 
human intervention.92 Indeed, one reason patent-law practitioners 
and scholars have often been wary of relying too heavily on the 
patentable-subject-matter requirement is that line drawing in the 
area—whether through bright-line rules or more flexible standards—
can be quite difficult.93 
From a policy standpoint, however, the U.S. government’s 
distinction has some appeal. As the science agencies and offices 
named on the amicus brief94 understand intimately, technology is 
moving beyond a focus on individual genes. Whole-genome 
sequencing of all 20,000 or so human genes is rapidly becoming the 
predominant focus of researchers. As a technical matter, whole-
genome sequencing will not infringe full-length cDNA patents 
covering exons that have been spliced together. But it might infringe 
certain other DNA-patent claims, most notably claims to very short 
nucleotide sequences.95 For firms engaged in whole-genome 
 
 90. See id. at 15 (“cDNAs . . . are synthetic molecules engineered by scientists to 
incorporate, in a single contiguous DNA segment, only the exons (i.e[.], protein-coding 
sequences) of a naturally occurring gene, and to exclude the intervening introns and other 
regulatory regions that normally separate the exons in genomic DNA.”). 
 91. The government’s brief did not address the method claims. Thus, I will not do so in this 
Essay. But these claims, as well as other method claims in various genetic diagnostic patents, are 
suspect on numerous grounds.  
 92. According to the plaintiffs in Myriad, however, gDNA fragments arise naturally in 
maternal plasma, in those suffering from cancer, and when DNA breaks. Plaintiffs-Appellees’ 
Petition for Panel Rehearing at 4–5, Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406). 
 93. See, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 
WIS. L. REV. 1353, 1407–10 (discussing the costs and benefits of “categorical” rules relative to 
“scope”-based standards).  
 94. These agencies and offices include not simply NIH, but also entities such as the White 
House Office of Science and Technology Policy, which was set up by Congress in the 1970s to 
coordinate science and technology policy across agencies. 
 95. In a recent paper, Professor Chris Holman analyzes 533 patents that explicitly mention 
a human DNA sequence in their claims. Christopher M. Holman, Will Gene Patents Impede 
Whole Genome Sequencing?: Deconstructing the Myth that 20% of the Human Genome Is 
Patented, 2 IP THEORY 1, 2–4 (2011). These 533 patents represented a subset of 4270 patents 
that then-doctoral candidate Kyle Jensen and Professor Fiona Murray had previously identified 
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sequencing, DNA-patent claims to very short sequences—found in 
the Myriad patents, as well as in other gene patents—represent a 
potential obstacle. Claims to very short sequences on which no 
splicing has been done would be invalid under the government’s test. 
Conversely, the government’s position would leave undisturbed 
most of the patents that the biotechnology industry justifiably regards 
as being important for its business model. Specifically, the 
government’s position would leave intact a vast array of patents on 
therapeutic end-products—not simply full-length cDNA patents but 
also patents on other laboratory-generated constructs such as vectors 
and recombinant plasmids. Because therapeutic end-products require 
FDA approval and, hence, a large investment to bring them to 
market, patents on such products are quite important.96 In contrast, 
because most gene-based diagnostics currently do not require FDA 
approval, the policy case for patent protection in those cases is 
weaker.97 
At the Federal Circuit level, Judges Alan Lourie and Kimberly 
Moore disagreed with the government’s position, finding both gDNA 
and cDNA to be subject matter eligible for patenting. But a version 
of the government’s position attracted support from one judge. In 
dissent, Judge William Bryson indicated that he would have drawn 
the line at full-length cDNA patents covering exons that had been 
spliced together. Judge Bryson specifically emphasized that Myriad’s 
product-patent claims to very short sequences of DNA might create 
 
as “human gene patents” in a prominent paper. Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual 
Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 310 SCIENCE 239, 239 (2005). Professor Holman 
concludes that of the 533 patents, the subset that is most likely to be infringed comprises claims 
to short fragments of DNA, such as a claim drawn to “any isolated DNA molecule comprising 
any sequence of 10 or more contiguous bases.” Holman, supra, at 9. Professor Holman also 
notes that this subset of claims is relatively small. But because the set of “human gene patents” 
identified by Jensen and Professor Murray is not only overinclusive, id. at 2–5, but also 
underinclusive, Jensen & Murray, supra, at 240, studies based on that set will not fully answer 
questions regarding possible thickets. Moreover, even a relatively small group in the subset 
examined by Holman might, if expanded to the entire human genome, yield several hundred 
claims to patents on short sequences. 
 96. The various data exclusivities provided to pioneer makers of biological therapies in the 
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), are fairly extensive but may not provide sufficient protection. 
 97. See, e.g., Robert Cook-Deegan, Subhashini Chandrasekharan & Misha Angrist, The 
Dangers of Diagnostic Monopolies, 458 NATURE 405, 405 (2009) (concluding, after assembling 
eight case studies addressing the effects of patents and licensing on access to genetic tests, that 
“patents have not caused irreparable harm in genetic diagnostics, but neither have they proven 
greatly advantageous”).  
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potential thickets for whole-genome sequencing.98 He further noted 
that even if the short-DNA-sequence patents could be held invalid on 
the ground that they were excessive in scope,99 “the costs involved in 
determining the scope of all those patents could be prohibitive.”100 To 
support this point, Judge Bryson cited a prominent report written by 
the Advisory Committee to the secretary of Health and Human 
Services that discussed the potential for such thickets.101 Until it was 
disbanded, the committee was the flagship external source of advice 
for all components of the Department of Health and Human 
Services—including NIH—on policy questions raised by genetic 
testing.102 
The Federal Circuit’s July 2011 decision, however, is by no 
means the end of the road. Although the panel denied rehearing, the 
plaintiffs in the Myriad litigation have filed for certiorari. So the story 
continues to unfold. 
In sum, the decades of debate over DNA-patent policy suggest 
that NIH has arguably been as important in shaping policy as the 
 
 98. See Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Bryson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“Accordingly, efforts to sequence almost any gene could infringe claim 6 
even though Myriad’s specification has contributed nothing to human understanding of other 
genes.”); id. at 1379–80 (citing SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND 
THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS 49–62 (2010)) (“Broad claims to 
genetic material present a significant obstacle to the next generation of innovation in genetic 
medicine—multiplex tests and whole-genome sequencing. New technologies are being 
developed to sequence many genes or even an entire human genome rapidly, but firms 
developing those technologies are encountering a thicket of patents.”). 
 99. Judge Bryson emphasized excessive scope as creating patentability issues with respect 
to novelty and obviousness. See id. at 1380 (“In order to sequence an entire genome, a firm 
would have to license thousands of patents from many different licensors. Even if many of those 
patents include claims that are invalid for anticipation or obviousness, the costs involved in 
determining the scope of all of those patents could be prohibitive.” (citation omitted)). 
Professor Thomas Kepler, a computational biologist, and his colleagues at Duke University 
have calculated that over 80 percent of the cDNA sequences contributed to GenBank before 
the Myriad patent application contained at least one of the short DNA sequences claimed by 
Myriad. Kepler et al., supra note 48, at 312.  
 100. Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1380. 
 101. See id. (citing SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 
97, at 49–62).  
 102. Notably, the report was not cited in the government’s brief. In general, although the 
government’s distinction between gDNA and cDNA neatly tracks some relevant policy 
considerations of which at least NIH and the HHS are clearly aware, the brief itself does not 
discuss those policy considerations. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Neither Party, supra note 16, at 10–36 (discussing the distinctions between gDNA and cDNA 
in a purely formal manner). 
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PTO itself. The assertive role that non-PTO executive-branch actors 
have played in disputes over patentability standards adds an 
important dimension to debates over how institutions should be 
structured to produce sound patent policy. The next Part considers 
these institutional questions. 
II.  PATENT POLICY: THE INSTITUTIONAL DEBATE 
Institutional-choice analysis—in this case, analysis of which 
government institutions should be responsible for crafting policy—
requires an initial discussion of what sound patent policy entails. 
Without some articulation of normative goals and design principles, 
observers will have difficulty evaluating whether a particular 
institution is likely to promote appropriate goals and principles. 
Consequently, before turning to specific institutions, I begin with a 
brief normative discussion of goals and principles. 
A. Sound Patent Policy: General Considerations 
For purposes of this Essay, I assume that the appropriate goal of 
patent policy is a technocratic one: the efficient promotion of 
technological innovation.103 If one assumes this goal, expertise in both 
economics and technology is a highly desirable attribute for any 
institution creating patent policy. 
Although scholars agree that innovation is the goal, they 
disagree substantially over how patentability standards should be 
calibrated to promote innovation. Reasonable minds can and do 
differ as to whether certain types of subject matter should be eligible 
for patenting in the first instance, as to when in the R&D process 
patents should be allowed, as to what the appropriate standard for 
nonobviousness should be, and as to whether patents should be 
narrow or broad. More broadly, scholars differ on the extent to which 
patents—as opposed to, for example, competition law, public R&D 
 
 103. By “innovation,” scholars mean both the initial invention and the commercialization of 
the invention. A focus on the efficient promotion of innovation as a goal obviously excludes 
important distributional considerations as well as noninstrumental considerations such as 
democratic accountability. For purposes of this Essay, I adopt this admittedly narrow 
framework. I bracket distributional and noninstrumental considerations not because they are 
unimportant but because they are extremely challenging. Whether and how patent law should 
encompass concerns that are unrelated to innovation are questions I hope to address in future 
work. 
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funding, or spillovers into the public domain—are the central drivers 
of innovation.104 
Unassailable empirical evidence with respect to any of these 
questions does not exist. But a lack of confidence in the ultimate 
substantive answers only increases the importance of the processes 
through which competing views and evidence are put forward. To put 
the point another way, information-gathering and decisionmaking 
processes must be protected from capture by an unrepresentative set 
of arguments or interests.105 Like expertise, avoidance of capture is a 
well-recognized design principle. 
Less recognized, but equally important as a design principle, is 
some institutional capacity for prospective action. Actions taken long 
after an issue has arisen, and that have retroactive effect, raise 
concerns about disturbing settled expectations. Indeed, as discussed 
further in Section C, concerns about disturbing settled expectations 
pervaded Judge Kimberly Moore’s opinion in Myriad II. Judge 
Moore’s concern about settled expectations emerged in part from her 
view that patents represent property rights. But one does not have to 
view patents as property rights to be concerned about the retroactive 
effects of litigation. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has long 
struggled with the question of how to reconcile norms that strongly 
favor judicial retroactivity with the equity and efficiency concerns 
raised by retroactivity when a case yields a new legal principle.106 As a 
practical matter, the Court’s resolution of the issue for civil cases has 
 
 104. The theoretical and empirical literature on different strategies for promoting 
innovation is truly voluminous. See, e.g., Benjamin & Rai, supra note 82, at 2 n.3 (surveying the 
literature). 
 105. The possibility of capture emerges in significant part from the logic of collective action. 
See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS (rev. ed. 1978) (arguing that groups with diffuse interests will have 
difficulty organizing to achieve collective action and optimal output). As a consequence of 
collective-action problems, small groups of players with concentrated interests will have an 
easier time organizing and influencing decisionmakers than will large, diffuse groups. 
 106. Many scholars have discussed the Court’s tangled jurisprudence in this area. See, e.g., 
Jill Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 
1059–67 (1997) (assessing the Court’s retroactivity doctrine); Alison L. LaCroix, Temporal 
Imperialism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1329, 1348–67 (2010) (examining “the Court’s experiments in 
the twentieth century with limiting the retroactive effect of its own decisions”); Kermit 
Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 
CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1081–1109 (1999) (analyzing the historical origins of retroactivity and 
modern retroactivity scholarship).  
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been a “firm rule of retroactivity.”107 Until and unless that resolution 
is disturbed, judicial decisionmaking in the patent context will take 
place in the shadow of serious concerns about the negative effects of 
retroactivity. 
Strong concerns about retroactivity can arise even in the absence 
of any concerns about stare decisis. Indeed, as Myriad II illustrates, 
concerns can arise even when the initial step down a path—in that 
case, the decision to deem virtually all DNA sequences to be subject 
matter eligible for patenting—was taken without any particular 
deliberation. Thus, to avoid the specter of policymaking by path 
dependence, some institutional capacity for prospectivity must be 
preserved. 
Another negative effect of judicial decisionmaking in the shadow 
of retroactivity may be a tendency toward rights expansion. This 
effect could arise because, as a practical matter, judges are likely to be 
more wary of retroactivity when they contract patent rights, thereby 
affecting clearly identifiable entities upon whom the government has 
conferred specific authority, than when they expand rights, thereby 
affecting diffuse groups who may not be seen as having settled 
expectations about their ability to use information without any threat 
of infringement liability. The retroactive effect of the expansion of 
patent rights is also limited by the reality that a judicial decision that 
expands patent rights cannot, under standard patent-law doctrines 
such as the requirement of novelty, put back into the realm of 
patentability information that has already passed into the public 
domain because it had not been considered patentable under a prior, 
stricter standard. 
 To be sure, as Professor David Schwartz argues, the Federal 
Circuit has, on various occasions, contracted patent rights without 
paying attention to retroactivity.108 As Professor Schwartz also notes, 
however, the Supreme Court—which generally receives the cases in 
which the potential for change is the largest—has repeatedly 
identified, and has generally heeded, concerns about retroactivity 
when it has been called upon to contract patent rights.109 
 
 107. LaCroix, supra note 106, at 1365 & n.156 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 
U.S. 244, 279 n.32 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 108. David L. Schwartz, Retroactivity in Patent Law 14–27 (Oct. 18, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=1945554. 
 109. Id. at 29–32. 
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 For the reasons discussed, institutional-choice analysis needs to 
take greater account of retroactivity. Nevertheless, concerns about 
retroactivity should not operate as a hair trigger. In certain cases, 
some amount of retroactivity and ex post action may be desirable or 
at least inevitable. For example, although ex ante bright-line rules 
provide clear answers and thus eliminate any concern about 
retroactivity in subsequent application, such rules have well-known 
shortcomings. Avoiding the errors and the potential for gaming 
produced by bright-line rules may be a good reason for using 
standards, even though such standards may in subsequent application 
have some retroactive effect.110 In addition, ex ante action should not 
preclude the possibility of subsequent adaptation and updating. 
With these background principles of sound patent policy in mind, 
I now turn to the comparative competence of particular patent 
institutions. 
B. Using Institutions To Promote Sound Patent Policy 
Conventional institutional analysis—and the views of a large 
number of Federal Circuit judges111—points to Congress as the 
obvious patent policymaker, at least in the first instance. Not only 
does Congress possess the ability to accumulate large amounts of 
policy-relevant information quickly, but it is also typically free to act 
prospectively, retroactively, or both, depending on the nature of a 
given problem.112 
 
 110. For a defense of standards over bright-line rules in the context of tax-law statutes and 
regulations, see generally David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 
860 (1999). 
 111. See, e.g., Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“If the law is to be changed, 
and DNA inventions excluded from the broad scope of [35 U.S.C. § 101] contrary to the settled 
expectation of the inventing community, the decision must come not from the courts, but from 
Congress.”); id. at 1367 (Moore, J., concurring in part) (cautioning that courts should be 
“particularly wary of expanding the judicial exception to patentable subject matter when both 
settled expectations and extensive property rights are involved” and suggesting that courts 
should instead “defer to Congress”); In re Fisher, 42 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating 
that PTO arguments regarding scientific progress are “public policy considerations . . . more 
appropriately directed to Congress as the legislative branch of government”). See generally S. 
Jay Plager, The Federal Circuit as an Institution: On Uncertainty and Policy Levers, 43 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 749 (2010) (discussing the judicial tendency to see Congress as the relevant policymaker 
in patent law). 
 112. Standard legal doctrine holds that legislation operates prospectively. The Court has 
also given Congress considerable leeway in acting retroactively. See Fisch, supra note 106, at 
1063–64 (“[T]he modern Court has been consistently deferential to legislative retroactivity.”). 
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Yet in spite of these promising attributes, patent-law scholars 
have often found the congressional option unsatisfactory.113 
Congressional legislation faces many obstacles, or “vetogates,”114 prior 
to passage, and legislative priorities are often unduly skewed by 
political expediency. Thus, Congress is usually unable to act quickly 
in the face of rapid technological development, whether the needed 
action involves passing legislation in the first instance or revising 
legislation that no longer comports with technological reality.115 
Moreover, the recent history of legislative patent-law reform 
demonstrates that members of Congress are susceptible to capture. 
This capture can take the “classic” form of a quid pro quo, in which a 
particular well-heeled interest group makes significant campaign 
contributions to a member of Congress in exchange for legislative 
promises. Alternatively, capture can take the form of informational 
capture, in which a well-heeled interest group inundates the 
congressional member with data purporting to show why the group’s 
preferred policy outcome advances the overall public welfare. 
Informational capture is possible because, notwithstanding its 
staff of 32,000 individuals, Congress is significantly less capable of 
marshaling neutral expertise on technological and economic issues 
than one might expect. Most members of its staff work in constituent 
services. Congress can draw upon the resources of the Congressional 
Research Service, the Congressional Budget Office, and the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), but each of these entities 
is constrained by its generalist focus. Meanwhile, Congress chose in 
1994 to abolish its innovation-focused Office of Technology 
 
 113. In general, in keeping with their technocratic focus on efficiency as a normative goal, 
patent-law scholars use functional, not formal, institutional analysis. Here, I similarly focus on 
functional considerations. 
 114. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444–48 (2008) (identifying nine different points at which “bills can die” 
before they become law). 
 115. See, e.g., Gary E. Marchant, The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and the 
Law, in THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL 
OVERSIGHT: THE PACING PROBLEM 19, 23 (Gary E. Marchant, Braden R. Allenby & Joseph R. 
Herkert eds., 2011) (reviewing literature that identifies procedural obstacles and skewed 
legislative prioritization as reasons why legislatures fail to keep up with emerging technologies). 
A much-discussed example of legislation that rapidly became outdated is the Semiconductor 
Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, tit. III, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 901–914 (2006)), which set up a sui generis regime of intellectual-property protection 
for chips.  
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Assessment (OTA), even though OTA reports were generally very 
highly regarded.116 
In the patent context, this capture dynamic does not necessarily 
lead to legislation that is entirely one-sided. For example, in the six-
year process leading up to the AIA, different congressional actors 
embraced well-heeled interest groups with competing views. Both the 
backers of biopharmaceutical firms and universities opposed to 
substantial reform and the backers of large high-technology firms 
supportive of substantial reform enjoyed congressional support.117 
 In theory, the result of this interest-group melee could be a 
roughly acceptable compromise. In practice, however, the many 
vetogates Congress faces tend to preclude passage of legislation that 
one or more well-heeled groups oppose, even if those groups oppose 
the legislation for no particularly strong reason.118 As a consequence, 
the AIA is modest in its ambitions. The reforms include only those 
improvements that commanded wide consensus among important 
interest groups.119 
Congress’s limited ability to act has caused the institutional 
discussion to focus on courts and agencies. Typically, scholars have 
viewed the PTO as the main agency engaged in policymaking 
involving patent validity. This attention is understandable, given that 
 
 116. The discussion in this paragraph and the preceding one is largely taken from Benjamin 
& Rai, supra note 82, at 42–46. 
 117. See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Will America Reinvent Itself? Patent Reform in 2011, BUS. 
L. TODAY, 1–2 (Aug. 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/content/2011/08/keeping
current-patents.pdf (discussing the divergent R&D models employed by various firms and 
noting that the “crosscurrents of [these] opposed powerful industry groups led to a stalemate on 
patent reform efforts in 2005”). 
 118. For example, before the Supreme Court rendered the question moot by deciding eBay, 
a significant obstacle to the passage of patent-reform legislation was the biopharmaceutical 
industry’s opposition to a provision that would have overturned the Federal Circuit’s rule in 
favor of automatic permanent injunctive relief. See, e.g., Amendment in the Nature of a 
Substitute to H.R. 2795, the “Patent Act of 2005”: Hearing on H.R. 2795 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 28–29 
(2005) (statement of Robert B. Chess, Chairman, Nektar Therapeutics) (“If you allowed courts 
to weigh equities and balance hardships, our patents would be weakened, and research and 
development would suffer.”). These predictions of doom proved unfounded. Although the 
biopharmaceutical industry faces many challenges, post-eBay case law on remedies is not one of 
them.  
 119. But the significant procedural improvements the AIA put in place are very important, 
particularly to the extent that they allow the PTO to function more efficiently. Many of these 
improvements are discussed in Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over Fact-Finding in the Patent 
System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907 (2004); and Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the 
Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1051 (2009) [hereinafter Rai, Growing Pains].  
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Congress has conferred upon the PTO the sole authority to 
adjudicate the validity of patent applications.120 Moreover, now that 
the PTO has the power to conduct postgrant review proceedings that 
resemble formal adjudications, the focus on the PTO is likely to 
intensify. 
Numerous scholars argue that, as between courts and the PTO, 
courts represent the more appropriate policymaker. These scholars 
assert that because the Patent Act has a structure similar to the 
Sherman Act’s, Congress has thereby delegated authority to the 
courts to make federal common law.121 Moreover, the history of court 
and common-law primacy arguably dates back to the first patent 
statute of 1790.122 
Scholars who favor courts recognize the limitations the judicial 
branch faces with respect to large-scale policy formulation. Courts 
can act only in the context of specific cases and controversies 
presented to them. Thus, as the Myriad litigation illustrates, 
important issues may be left undecided for long periods of time. 
Moreover, the goal of resolving a particular controversy may 
sometimes be in tension with the goal of broad-based policy 
formulation.123 Scholars who favor courts also acknowledge 
limitations with respect to the two patent-specific considerations 
discussed in the previous Section: expertise and avoidance of capture. 
Even a specialized court like the Federal Circuit does not have the 
expertise systematically to understand every area of science or to 
 
 120. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2006).  
 121. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 20, at 103 (suggesting that the Patent Act is 
more akin to the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006), than the tax code because judicially 
created doctrines play a large role in the application of both the Patent Act and the Sherman 
Act); Nard, supra note 20, at 53 (2010) (“[T]he patent code, much like the Sherman Act, is a 
common law enabling statute, leaving ample room for the courts to fill in the interstices . . . .” 
(footnotes omitted)). In prior work, I have also made this argument. See Arti K. Rai, Engaging 
Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1035, 1116–20 (2003) (discussing analogies between the patent and antitrust statutes and stating 
that “the patent statute, as currently structured, contemplates . . . judicial development of patent 
common law”). 
 122. Nard, supra note 20, at 53 n.9 (“[T]he structure of the patent code and corresponding 
delegation of judicial lawmaking power has remained a fixture since 1790.”). 
 123. R. Polk Wagner, The Two Federal Circuits, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 785, 789–90 (2010) 
(exploring the Federal Circuit’s dual role as a “decider” of cases and a “manager” of the 
jurisprudence and explaining that those two roles may “diverge”).  
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collect and analyze economic data.124 Furthermore, like other 
specialized courts, the Federal Circuit is susceptible to capture.125 
Scholars do not appear to have recognized, however, the extent 
to which judicial modes of policymaking operate in the shadow of 
retroactivity. As noted in Section A, retroactivity makes significant 
contraction of patentability difficult, even if a particular patent-
issuance practice emerged without deliberation and thus resembles, in 
the words of Judge Bryson in Myriad II, a “collective right of adverse 
possession.”126 
Scholars also overestimate the normative case against 
administratively driven, prospective policymaking. One common 
argument against a large administrative presence in patent law is that 
patents are property rights and therefore should not be subject to 
administrative regulation. This argument has little merit. Even 
assuming that patents are property rights,127 and even further 
assuming that patents are constitutionally protected property rights 
for purposes of the Takings Clause,128 patents could still be subject to 
regulation. Agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) routinely regulate tangible property rights. Given that the 
American legal system has longstanding models for the administrative 
regulation of tangible property rights, the case for carving out an 
exception for intangible property rights seems dubious. 
Indeed, for those who are concerned about protecting settled 
expectations associated with property rights, judicial development of 
 
 124. Although Federal Circuit clerks generally have a technical background and the Federal 
Circuit has a small technical staff, this level of staffing does not approach that of the PTO. At 
the conclusion of FY2011, the PTO had 6785 examiners. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 187 tbl.29 (2011), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2011/USPTOFY2011PAR.pdf. Moreover, 
as discussed further in Part IV, it has set up an Office of the Chief Economist. 
 125. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 1, at 314–16 (suggesting that capture can be seen in 
“various empirical studies indicat[ing] that the Federal Circuit is substantially less likely . . . to 
find patents invalid than its predecessor regional courts of appeals”). 
 126. Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Bryson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 127. To put it mildly, this issue is contested. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual 
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1035 n.8 (2005) (listing numerous articles by 
scholars who regard patents as being different from ordinary property). The argument for 
equating patents with property rights is particularly weak in the information-technology 
industries, in which portfolios comprising large numbers of patents with unclear boundaries are 
the norm. See infra Part III. 
 128. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”). 
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patent law should be more troubling than administrative 
development, as it is more likely to disrupt these expectations. Not 
only can administrative rule changes explicitly be made prospective, 
but standard administrative-law doctrine also counsels against 
retroactive rulemaking absent specific congressional authorization.129 
Even for agencies like the PTO, which does not have rulemaking 
authority over questions of patent validity, ex ante decisionmaking 
through guidelines that can be quickly assessed by the courts in the 
context of particular test cases is less likely to have retroactive effects 
than traditional judicial decisionmaking.  
Notably, with the AIA’s establishment of robust procedures for 
postgrant administrative review, PTO guidelines can be challenged 
quickly, not only in decisions to deny patents but also in decisions to 
grant patents that will later be susceptible to challenge postgrant. In 
fact, the AIA specifically authorizes the PTO director to institute 
postgrant review proceedings to address “novel or unsettled legal 
question[s] that [are] important to other patents or patent 
applications.”130 Such novel or unsettled questions could obviously 
include questions first identified in PTO guidelines. 
The most compelling objection to an administrative approach to 
patent policymaking arises from concerns about capture. The 
administrative-capture argument deserves serious attention even 
though, as noted, the Federal Circuit is itself not immune from 
capture. Precisely what capture means for administrative approaches 
to patent law is not as straightforward as some scholars assume. In 
contrast with the quid pro quo style of capture associated with 
members of Congress, agency heads cannot be captured through 
direct monetary contributions. For this reason, theorists of agency 
capture have typically been concerned about such issues as a 
revolving door between the agency and the industry groups it 
regulates, informational capture, and efforts by agency officials to 
curry favor with industry groups that will then act on the agency’s 
behalf in securing budget increases and other benefits for the agency 
from captured members of Congress.131 
 
 129. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) 
(“[C]ongressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive 
effect unless their language requires this result.”). 
 130. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 6, § 324(b), 125 Stat. 284, 
307 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 324(b)). 
 131. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through 
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 22–23 (2010) (providing an overview of the key issues 
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As noted earlier, however, the regulated industries in the patent 
system are numerous and possess diverse views of patents. A PTO 
decision putting forward a strict interpretation of the patent-validity 
requirements might therefore be just as useful for generating support 
from relevant interest groups as a lax view of such requirements. 
Thus, for example, 2011 PTO examination guidelines focused on 
software-application claims significantly restrict the potential scope of 
such claims.132  
Ultimately, insofar as the PTO is biased, it is biased for many of 
the same reasons that the Federal Circuit has sometimes been seen as 
biased. Both institutions tend to perceive patents—as opposed to, for 
example, competition law, public R&D funding, or spillovers into the 
public domain—as the central drivers of innovation. Relatedly, both 
institutions hear disproportionately from patent lawyers. Although 
patent lawyers may represent both plaintiffs and defendants in cases, 
associations of patent lawyers are often perceived as being quite pro-
patentee.133 The available empirical data on amicus briefing backs up 
that perception—in Federal Circuit and Supreme Court cases, 55 
percent of amicus briefs filed by bar associations favor the patentee, a 
percentage that is considerably higher than the 5 percent filed by 
high-tech companies in favor of the patentee or the 28 percent filed 
by the government.134 
 
contributing to agency capture such as the “revolving-door phenomenon” and “information 
advantage”). 
 132. See Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 35 
U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 7162, 7171 
(Feb. 9, 2011) (“Specifically, the scope of the claims must be less than or equal to the scope of 
the enablement provided by the specification.”). Holding the line of validity can also discourage 
frivolous applications and reduce workload. Concerns about PTO workload loomed large in the 
government’s decision to take a strong stance against a rigid TSM test. See supra text 
accompanying notes 37–42. 
Patent scholars sometimes suggest that because the PTO’s operations depend on 
applicant fees, the agency will be biased in favor of patentability. But this argument is too facile. 
Standard constitutional law requires that, absent explicit congressional authorization, agencies 
can only charge fees sufficient to recover costs. As long as denying applications produces cost 
recovery in the same manner as granting applications, dependence on fees should not, in and of 
itself, be a source of bias. A bias problem instead arises primarily because Congress has 
historically set fee schedules in a manner that requires patent grants substantially to subsidize 
denials. Rai, Growing Pains, supra 119, at 2067–68. The fee-setting authority conferred on the 
PTO through the AIA allows the PTO to fix this bias. 
 133. Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach Us About 
the Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 395, 421–22 (2011). 
 134. Id. at 421 nn.155–56. 
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Reasonable minds can differ over whether the views of the PTO 
and the Federal Circuit are correct. Scholars do not, after all, have 
unassailable empirical evidence regarding the relative importance of 
patents, even for particular players in particular industries. As noted, 
however, lack of confidence in any ultimate substantive answer only 
makes the process by which competing views are put forward even 
more important. More frequently than is done in the existing system, 
those views should be aired in a decisionmaking process that occurs 
before substantial R&D investments have been made. Although ex 
ante decisionmaking is not always possible or desirable, the existing 
system, in which most important policy questions are left open until 
the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court happens to take a case 
implicating them, tilts unduly towards the ex post alternative. 
C. The DNA-Patenting Controversies as Institutional-Choice Case 
Studies 
If the institutional desiderata include expertise, avoidance of 
capture, and prospective action, the DNA-patenting controversies 
provide a useful dichotomy: In the debate over the utility and written-
description guidelines, expertise was deployed in a prospective 
manner that avoided capture. By contrast, in the patentable-subject-
matter debate, non-PTO expertise questioning the conventional 
wisdom was deployed late in the game and was therefore significantly 
less useful. 
When faced with the PTO’s utility guidelines in In re Fisher, the 
Federal Circuit had good reason to uphold them. Indeed, the court’s 
opinion should have gone significantly further than its lukewarm 
statement that the guidelines could be given “judicial notice to the 
extent they do not conflict with the statute.”135 In general, PTO 
actions should be given at least the default level of deference 
prescribed by the Court in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.136 The Skidmore 
default, which applies when higher levels of deference do not, holds 
that agency action is given deference “depend[ing] upon the 
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, 
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those 
factors which give it power to persuade.”137 Under Skidmore, an 
 
 135. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-
Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 136. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 137. Id. at 140. 
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agreement reached by expert agencies after extensive debate surely 
exhibits, at a minimum, thoroughness of consideration. 
By contrast, in Myriad II, the Skidmore preference for 
“consistency with earlier . . . pronouncements” was violated. More 
generally, concerns about retroactive impact counseled against 
judicial adoption of the government’s position. Judge Moore’s 
concurrence put the point particularly sharply: according to Judge 
Moore, if she were deciding the case “on a blank canvas,” she might 
well have concluded that certain types of claims involving gDNA 
sequences were not patentable subject matter.138 In response, Judge 
Bryson’s dissent noted that the courts could look to precedent that 
had reversed long-held PTO determinations; for example, the 
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Chakrabarty had reversed the 
settled PTO practice of denying patents to microorganisms.139 Judge 
Moore’s rebuttal highlighted the manner in which judicial 
retroactivity can create a one-way ratchet in patent law; she observed 
that “there is a clear difference between allowing additional patent 
protection where none previously existed, and denying patent 
protection decades (or centuries) after the fact, thereby eliminating a 
large number of property rights.”140 
For purposes of thinking more broadly about the executive 
branch’s prospective policymaking role, however, the relevance of the 
DNA-patenting case studies is limited. Most of the prospective 
agency action outside of the PTO has come from NIH in the context 
of the life sciences. Even within the life sciences, NIH is not 
necessarily the ideal sister agency to engage with the PTO. Although 
NIH’s mission encompasses both seeking “fundamental knowledge” 
and the “application of that knowledge to enhance health,”141 NIH is 
not necessarily an expert in the law and economics of transforming 
life-science research into commercial invention. Indeed, NIH 
employed flawed legal and economic reasoning in its initial decision 
to seek EST patents. Moreover, although NIH subsequently raised 
utility and written-description objections to DNA patenting, it did not 
raise patentable-subject-matter questions.142 
 
 138. Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., concurring in part). 
 139. Id. at 1381 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 140. Id. at 1370 (Moore, J., concurring in part).  
 141. Mission, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Mar. 3, 2011), www.nih.gov/about/mission.htm. 
 142. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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Nor is legal and social-science work necessarily NIH’s highest 
priority. GAO reports from the 1990s cited significant deficiencies in 
the agency’s implementation of the basic accountability and reporting 
provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act,143 the statute that governs the 
commercialization of federally funded research.144  
In sum, although NIH has played a very valuable role in pushing 
the patent community to consider certain issues of DNA patenting ex 
ante, a more comprehensive ex ante approach will require enlisting 
other agencies and executive-branch components. The next Part 
discusses agencies and components that could fulfill this role. For 
purposes of investigating the question concretely, Part III uses 
software patents as an example. 
III.  BEYOND THE UTILITY AND WRITTEN-DESCRIPTION 
GUIDELINES: OTHER EX ANTE APPROACHES TO PATENT VALIDITY 
As noted, non-PTO executive-branch actors such as NIH have 
played useful roles in the evolution of patentability policy in the field 
of biotechnology. But biotechnology is only one area of innovation 
and, even within this area, the record of involvement by executive-
branch actors other than the PTO is less than perfect. Resolving the 
institutional need for greater ex ante policymaking requires 
broadening the perspective with which scholars have generally 
approached the institutional-choice question. In this Part, I attempt to 
do so by invoking an entirely different, but equally important, area of 
technology: software. 
Software patents are highly controversial, perhaps even more so 
than gene patents. Some commentators argue that software should 
per se not constitute patentable subject matter. Many others complain 
that software patents have undue breadth and suffer from unclear 
boundaries.145 These commentators also contend that the 
consequences of the poor quality and large quantity of software 
patents include patent thickets. At a minimum, these thickets require 
 
 143. Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
 144. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-99-242, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: 
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERALLY SPONSORED INVENTIONS NEED REVISION 5–6 
(1999). 
 145. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATION AT RISK 187–214 (2008) (discussing the 
vagueness and undue breadth of software patents). 
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firms to expend significant resources maintaining large defensive 
patent portfolios.146  
The problems of excessive breadth and unclear boundaries can 
be traced in part to the evolution of patentable-subject-matter 
jurisprudence in the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1981 case Diamond v. 
Diehr,147 a 5–4 majority of the Supreme Court shifted from skepticism 
toward software claims to measured acceptance. The Court concluded 
that a patent claim to a process for curing rubber that relied heavily 
on software implementing the Arrhenius equation was patentable 
because the process as a whole “transformed” the rubber into a 
“different state or thing.”148  
After this decision, the PTO began to receive significant 
numbers of applications for patents encompassing software. The PTO 
tried, however, to use the patentable-subject-matter doctrine to limit 
the scope of software patents. Perhaps most notably, in the 1994 case 
of In re Alappat,149 the PTO asserted that the “means plus function” 
claims in question—essentially, claims to any computer “means” that 
could perform particular mathematical functions—did not represent 
patentable subject matter.150 According to the PTO, applications that 
could encompass any general-purpose computer represented 
unpatentable mathematical algorithms. 
Sitting en banc, the Federal Circuit rejected the PTO’s 
conclusion. The majority determined that the claims in question 
covered a “specific machine” that produces a “useful, concrete, and 
tangible result.”151 Judges Glenn Archer and Helen Nies did, however, 
author a powerful dissent pointing out that the patent applicant was 
simply claiming “old circuitry elements in an arrangement defined by 
a mathematical operation, which only performs the very mathematical 
operation that defines it.”152 Their dissent largely adopted the position 
 
 146. See, e.g., Rai, Growing Pains, supra note 119, at 2068–70 (discussing the literature on 
patent thickets, defensive patent portfolios, and the possibility of using certain types of filing 
fees to control thickets).  
 147. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 148. Id. at 183. 
 149. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).  
 150. Id. at 1565. 
 151. Id. at 1544. 
 152. Id. at 1563. 
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taken by the PTO, as well as by Seagate, the single technology 
company that chose to file an amicus brief in the case.153 
Now imagine that the PTO’s resistance to the broad scope of 
software patents had been supported by another executive-branch 
agency. Specifically, the PTO might have found support in the DOJ 
Antitrust Division, an agency with deep economic expertise and a 
vision of innovation that relies heavily on competition. Further, 
suppose that the bond between the PTO and the Antitrust Division 
had been forged because they had worked together to issue, through 
the notice-and-comment process, guidelines that identified the 
appropriateness, under Diehr and other Supreme Court case law, of 
rejecting claims that purported to cover a mathematical operation 
performed via a generic computer. The PTO and Antitrust Division 
might then have worked together to convince the SG to file a petition 
for certiorari. 
If the SG’s track record of success in convincing the Supreme 
Court to take patent cases had been applicable,154 the Court might 
well have taken the case. At the Supreme Court level, additional 
technology companies would presumably have supported limitations 
on the patents’ scope.155 Were the Supreme Court then to have held in 
favor of the government, it might have provided some early 
resolution of software patent-scope questions. 
In reality, the Federal Circuit did not squarely address the issue 
of software-patent scope until over a decade later. Starting in 2008, in 
cases such as Aristocrat Technologies Australia PTY Ltd. v. 
International Game Technology,156 three-judge panels on the court 
began holding that “means plus function” patent claims that 
encompassed any computer “means” were invalid under the 
disclosure section of the Patent Act unless the application in question 
included specific information about the algorithm involved.157 
 
 153. See Richard H. Stern & Edward P. Heller, III, In re Alappat: The Gordian Knot 
Retwisted, 2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187, 187 (1994) (discussing the problems with allowing 
patents on algorithms when “the claims are ‘limited’ to use of the algorithm in programmed 
computer equipment”). Professor Stern was the author of Seagate’s amicus brief, and Heller 
was patent counsel for Seagate Technology.  
 154. Duffy, supra note 13, at 519. 
 155. Not surprisingly, patent cases before the Court draw far more amicus briefs than do 
cases before the Federal Circuit. Chien, supra note 133, at 417–18. 
 156. Aristocrat Techs. Austl. PTY Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 157. Id. at 1333; see also Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (“[T]he patent must disclose, at least to the satisfaction of one of ordinary skill in the art, 
enough of an algorithm to provide the necessary structure . . . .”). 
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Although these cases are quite valuable—especially as they have 
been interpreted in recent PTO-examination guidelines158—they stake 
out a position that is somewhat more modest than the position 
advanced by the PTO in Alappat. In addition, the cases came more 
than a decade after widespread complaints regarding the vagueness 
and overbreadth of software patents had begun to emerge. 
As a real-world matter, how might policymakers engineer more 
frequent consultation ex ante between the PTO and “competition-
oriented” executive-branch agencies such as the DOJ Antitrust 
Division? In general, pressure to engage in interagency consultation is 
often provided by powerful White House offices and components 
such as the Office of Management and Budget or the National 
Economic Council. Prominent think tanks have recently emphasized 
the pressing need for individuals within these offices to focus on 
interagency innovation and long-term competition strategy.159 The 
official job descriptions for members of these offices should include 
facilitating, or even mandating, consultation between agencies with 
diverse perspectives on innovation. 
IV.  RULEMAKING AUTHORITY OVER QUESTIONS OF 
PATENTABILITY? 
To those with an administrative-law bent, the preceding 
discussion of guidelines and ex ante decisionmaking might seem a 
half-measure. Why not simply confer upon the PTO rulemaking 
authority over questions of patent validity? Under standard 
administrative-law doctrine, courts would then have to give such rules 
the strong form of deference enunciated in Chevron and its progeny. 
 
 158. See Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 32 
U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 7162, 7168 
(Feb. 9, 2011) (“The structure corresponding to a . . . claim limitation for a computer-
implemented function must include the algorithm needed to transform the general purpose 
computer or microprocessor disclosed in the specification.”). 
 159. See, e.g., JOHN PODESTA, SARAH ROSEN WARTELL & JITINDER KOHLI, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS, A FOCUS ON COMPETITIVENESS: RESTRUCTURING POLICYMAKING FOR RESULTS 
19 (2010), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/12/pdf/competitiveness.pdf 
(recommending the development of an Interagency Competitiveness Task Force, led by a new 
deputy at the National Economic Council, that would “oversee[] White House coordination of 
competitiveness initiatives, and monitor[] their implementation by agencies”). In prior work 
endorsed by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, Professor Stuart 
Benjamin and I propose the creation of a White House Office of Innovation Policy that would 
coordinate innovation policy across agencies. STUART MINOR BENJAMIN & ARTI K. RAI, 
STRUCTURING U.S. INNOVATION POLICY: CREATING A WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF 
INNOVATION POLICY (2009), available at http://www.itif.org/files/WhiteHouse_Innovation.pdf. 
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Additionally, as contrasted with guidelines, which are likely to be 
prospective in nature only because they are likely to address issues 
presented in more recent applications, administrative-law doctrine 
affirmatively requires that, absent specific congressional 
authorization, rules address issues prospectively.160 Rules enacted 
pursuant to congressionally delegated authority also would not have 
to wait for court approval to have the imprimatur of law. Indeed, 
unless challenged, they would be law. Rulemaking could therefore 
produce controlling authority even more quickly than guidelines. 
Yet most scholarly discussions of an administrative model for the 
patent system, including my own, have generally stopped short of 
advocating a congressional grant of rulemaking authority on core 
questions of patentability—that is, authority over such questions as 
what constitutes patentable subject matter, what represents 
nonobviousness, and what type of disclosure is necessary to satisfy 
Section 112 of the Patent Act.161 In prior work, I argue that conferring 
such authority would be premature because the PTO lacks the large 
cadre of economists and policy-oriented thinkers possessed by other 
agencies—such as the Federal Communications Commission and the 
FTC—that work on questions of technological innovation and that 
have at least some rulemaking authority.162 
Since that work was published, however, the PTO has created 
and staffed an Office of the Chief Economist. Early versions of the 
2007 patent-reform bill163 included language conferring on the PTO 
rulemaking authority not only over questions of patentability but also 
 
 160. See supra note 129. 
 161. The existing scope of the PTO’s rulemaking authority is not entirely clear. The Federal 
Circuit, as well as many commentators, have framed the question in terms of substance versus 
procedure. See, e.g., Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (analyzing “whether the 
Final Rules are substantive or procedural”). For an engaging argument that the substance-
versus-procedure distinction is not grounded in the language of the Patent Act and that the 
PTO might have rulemaking authority that extends beyond the strict confines of procedure, see 
Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 8), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920417. See also 
Tafas, 559 F.3d at 1366 (Bryson, J., concurring) (“While I think it is generally fair to 
characterize that statute as authorizing the promulgation of ‘procedural’ regulations, however, I 
do not think it necessary, or particularly helpful, to consider whether those regulations would be 
deemed ‘substantive’. . . .”). Neither Professor Tran nor Judge Bryson argues, however, that the 
PTO has rulemaking authority over issues such as patentable subject matter, obviousness, or the 
like.  
 162. Rai, supra note 121, at 1132–33.  
 163. Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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over all aspects of the Patent Act.164 Perhaps in reaction to this 
expression of congressional interest, several scholarly articles advance 
the conventional suite of administrative-law arguments that favor 
conferring significant rulemaking authority on agencies that tackle 
technologically and economically complex questions.165 These 
commentators argue that Congress should grant the PTO rulemaking 
authority over all issues of patent validity or, at the very least, over 
specific questions such as what constitutes patentable subject 
matter.166 As these scholars emphasize, concerns about certain 
pathologies of the administrative state—including concerns about 
capture or about decisionmaking that is unduly responsive to changes 
in presidential administration—are hardly limited to the patent 
context. To the contrary, as discussed in Part II, the issue of PTO 
capture is more complex than most scholars acknowledge. Given the 
existence of competing well-heeled interest groups with diverse views, 
one-sided capture is unlikely.  
Notably, in the context of a grant of rulemaking authority to the 
PTO, Congress could explicitly require the PTO to consult with 
specific agencies before making a rule. Congress has already 
embedded such consultation requirements within a variety of 
statutes.167 At least one empirical study involving the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) found that appropriately designed 
consultation requirements can force an agency to consider concerns 
 
 164. Id. § 11. 
 165. See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1785 
(2011) (“[S]ound patent policymaking depends on the ability of the decision maker to marshal 
relevant information . . . . On balance, agency rulemaking is more likely to reflect those 
characteristics than judicial adjudication.”); John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and 
Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1096 (“The categorical, policy-laden nature of the 
resulting interpretive questions suggests that these questions are better left to primary 
resolution by a policy organ specially concerned with such questions—namely, an administrative 
agency.”); Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 279 (“The time has 
come to consider reorienting patent law’s institutional arrangements to bring them more into 
line with the rest of the administrative state.”).  
 166. See, e.g., Burstein, supra note 165, at 1806 (“Given the importance of innovation to 
economic growth and cultural well-being, it is critical that the institutions responsible for 
making innovation policy decisions be rationalized. Granting the PTO substantive rule-making 
authority is a good first step.”); Golden, supra note 165, at 1111 (“[T]he best agency to carry 
out . . . rulemaking [related to patentable subject matter] is the USPTO.”); Masur, supra note 
165, at 279 (“[T]he most straightforward means of achieving this would be for Congress to 
endow the PTO with substantive rule-making authority.”).  
 167. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedure as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1749, 1799 n.275 (2007) (listing the statutes containing consultation requirements). 
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that it would otherwise ignore.168 Specifically, congressional passage of 
strict consultation requirements in the Electric Consumers Protection 
Act of 1986169 “forc[ed] FERC to pay attention to the environmental 
concerns it had long ignored.”170 
The swift elimination of the expanded rulemaking-authority 
provision from the 2007 predecessor to the AIA suggests that a move 
in this direction might not be politically feasible, at least not in the 
political climate and setting in which the AIA was passed. No 
prominent interest group is advocating for such authority, and many 
interest groups view the regulation of patents as being inconsistent 
with the principle that patents are property rights. As the example of 
the EPA, among many others, illustrates, the view that agencies never 
regulate property rights is incorrect. Nonetheless, that view continues 
to hold sway among many powerful groups. Until that view is 
abandoned, an intermediate approach is needed. An approach based 
on ex ante PTO guidelines backed by the full weight of the executive 
branch has already shown some promise. Especially to the extent that 
courts properly give significant deference under Skidmore to 
considered executive-branch decisions, a guidelines-based approach 
should be made a much more integral part of patent policymaking. 
In fact, the executive branch could also use the postgrant-review 
authority conferred upon the PTO by the AIA to go one step further. 
As a doctrinal matter, under current Supreme Court precedent 
interpreting the contexts in which Chevron applies, the government 
could ask for Chevron deference toward decisions made in postgrant 
review proceedings.171 As a normative matter, in cases in which the 
PTO is applying guidelines formulated after widespread consultation 
with relevant stakeholders, courts should be inclined to give those 
guidelines strong deference. To be sure, administrative-law scholars 
generally disfavor large-scale policymaking through agency 
adjudication. As they rightly note, for purposes of policymaking, 
agency adjudication suffers from some of the same defects as 
 
 168. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
2217, 2221–22 (2005). 
 169. Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). 
 170. Id. 
 171. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (holding that Chevron 
deference generally applies in proceedings that resemble formal adjudications). 
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adjudication in the courts.172 Rulemaking, not adjudication, is the 
innovation of the administrative state. But in this case, adjudication 
would have been preceded by an activity much like rulemaking: 
guideline formation through widespread consultation with relevant 
stakeholders. 
CONCLUSION 
Among patent scholars who address institutional questions, a 
significant number tend to favor the judiciary over the PTO as the 
policymaker of choice. Even though courts have familiar limitations 
with respect to policymaking, scholars often argue that the PTO is 
more likely to be captured. On closer examination, however, this 
capture story is less obviously true than it might seem. Further, at 
least in DNA-patenting cases, in which PTO decisionmaking has been 
heavily influenced by other executive-branch decisionmakers, the 
conclusions reached by the executive branch have been defensible 
vis-à-vis charges of capture. 
Executive-branch firepower should be deployed to a greater 
extent ex ante. The ex post development of patent law by the courts 
poses many familiar problems. Less recognized, but important, it 
often yields a one-way ratchet toward the expansion of patent 
protection. When courts expand patent rights, they generally do not 
have to worry much about retroactive effects. By contrast, as the 
Myriad case illustrates, courts face legitimate concerns about 
retroactive effect when they are called upon to curtail such rights. 
More frequent ex ante intervention would avoid these problems 
without precluding ex post development and adaptation. Moreover, 
whereas the existing system forces courts to act with only limited 
guidance from technologically and economically sophisticated 
executive-branch agencies, this Essay’s call for ex ante intervention 
would help lay a sound foundation for further ex post development. 
Ultimately, as the DNA-patenting cases demonstrate, early and 
robust executive-branch discussion of patent policy should be 
welcomed by all those interested in improving the patent system.  
 
 172. Cf. M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Forum, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1383, 1384–85 (2004) (noting the widespread view that rulemaking is the preferred policymaking 
vehicle). 
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